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Brown Seeks Answers from Federal Pipeline Safety Administration on Rainbow Terrace Explosion

November 12, 2026

Brown letter seeks documentation that agencies and Enbridge Gas took proper action before and after explosion; next steps on safety

Washington, DC – Congresswoman Shontel Brown (OH-11) has written to the Department of Transportation (USDOT) demanding answers related to the explosion at the Rainbow Terrace Apartments in Cleveland. 

 

On November 10, Brown wrote to the USDOT Secretary Sean Duffy and Paul Roberti, Administrator of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) seeking information related to the federal investigation into the explosion. The PHMSA develops and enforces regulations for the safe, reliable, and environmentally sound operation of the nation's pipelines. 

 

Brown’s extensive letter seeks answers to 28 specific questions and is focused on determining if the PHSMA, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, as well as Enbridge Gas, took proper action before and after the explosion, and if the federal regulator is recommending next steps to improve public safety. Brown’s letter gives USDOT and PHSMA thirty days to respond. The letter was also sent to the leaders of the relevant committees in the House. 

 

“I speak with and speak for my constituents at Rainbow Terrace and across Northeast Ohio: we had a deadly explosion here in Cleveland and we still don’t know why. That’s simply unacceptable. We need answers, answers so there can be accountability and answers so we can prevent further tragedies,” said Congresswoman Shontel Brown. 

 

Brown writes, “Because of this tragedy, people were killed, injured, and lost their homes, and many more are now worried about the safety of their own home or apartment building. Over a year later, we still don’t know why this explosion happened and my constituents need answers. This letter seeks a full accounting of the federal response to the Rainbow Terrace Explosion, clear answers on if Enbridge and PUCO fully cooperated with federal reporting requirements, if Enbridge and PUCO fully cooperated with federal and local investigations, if federal safety violations were identified, and what steps are being taken to prevent another explosion.”

 

 

 

For a pdf of the letter click here.

 

 

The full letter reads as follows: 

 

Dear Secretary Duffy and Administrator Roberti:

I write regarding the June 23, 2025 explosion and fire at Rainbow Terrace Apartments in Cleveland, Ohio, which resulted in the death of one resident, injuries to others, the destruction of 44 apartment units, and the displacement of families. I respectfully request information concerning the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (“DOT”) and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (“PHMSA”) federal pipeline safety responsibilities, including the applicable regulatory requirements, the response, and coordination with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”).

On September 28, 2026, the City of Cleveland released an Executive Summary of Rainbow Terrace Investigative Efforts, together with investigative materials prepared by the Cleveland Division of Fire, PUCO, Enbridge Gas Ohio, and Enbridge’s retained investigator. The Cleveland Division of Fire concluded that natural gas accumulated in the lower levels of the affected building before encountering an unknown ignition source. However, investigators could not establish the source of the gas release or ignition, and the cause of the explosion remains classified as undetermined.[1]

Although PUCO did not identify regulatory or compliance failures by Enbridge that caused or contributed to the explosion, its investigation documented deficiencies in the company’s post-incident response. These included inaccurate geographic information system (“GIS”) mapping that failed to identify an active service line, difficulties identifying and isolating the appropriate gas infrastructure, and deficiencies in post-incident leak detection. According to the investigative materials, an uncontrolled release of natural gas continued for approximately 20 hours following the explosion.[2]

These findings raise important questions regarding the adequacy of pipeline operator emergency-response procedures, infrastructure records, incident-investigation practices, and compliance with applicable safety requirements. They also warrant clarification of the respective responsibilities of PHMSA, PUCO, and regulated pipeline operators when serious incidents occur.

Under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, PHMSA establishes minimum federal pipeline safety standards, including requirements governing natural gas distribution systems. Ohio administers a certified state pipeline safety program under 49 U.S.C. § 60105, through which PUCO exercises enforcement responsibilities for covered intrastate facilities, subject to federal oversight.[3]

Given the seriousness of the Rainbow Terrace explosion and the deficiencies identified in the subsequent response, I respectfully request information concerning PHMSA’s role in this matter, the applicable federal pipeline safety requirements, and any opportunities to strengthen pipeline safety and emergency preparedness. Because of this tragedy, people were killed, injured, and lost their homes, and many more are now worried about the safety of their own home or apartment building. Over a year later, we still don’t know why this explosion happened and my constituents need answers. This letter seeks a full accounting of the federal response to the Rainbow Terrace Explosion, clear answers on if Enbridge and PUCO fully cooperated with federal reporting requirements, if Enbridge and PUCO fully cooperated with federal and local investigations, if federal safety violations were identified, and what steps are being taken to prevent another explosion.

This inquiry is focused on DOT’s and PHMSA’s federal pipeline safety responsibilities.

I. PHMSA’s Investigative Role and Federal-State Coordination

Please provide information concerning PHMSA’s involvement in the Rainbow Terrace incident and its coordination with PUCO, including:

  1. Whether PHMSA received notification of the June 23, 2025 explosion, an incident report from Enbridge, investigative findings from PUCO, or other relevant information concerning Rainbow Terrace. Please provide the dates, nature, and disposition of such notifications or submissions;
  2. Whether PHMSA conducted, participated in, assisted with, or independently reviewed any investigation of the incident, including any technical assessments, compliance evaluations, or reviews of Enbridge’s post-incident response;
  3. Whether PHMSA has reviewed PUCO’s investigative findings, including the deficiencies involving gas-system mapping, service-line identification and isolation, and post-incident leak detection, and whether PHMSA concurs with, disputes, or has sought clarification regarding any of those findings;
  4. A description of PHMSA’s oversight responsibilities concerning PUCO’s certified state pipeline safety program, including the circumstances under which PHMSA may request additional information, conduct a federal review, provide technical assistance, or recommend further regulatory action following an intrastate pipeline incident;
  5. Whether PHMSA has communicated with PUCO, Enbridge, the City of Cleveland, or other relevant entities regarding corrective actions, additional inspections, compliance concerns, or safety recommendations arising from Rainbow Terrace; and
  6. Whether PHMSA anticipates any additional investigative, technical, regulatory, or oversight activities concerning this incident and, if so, the anticipated scope and timeline.

II. Federal Pipeline Safety Requirements

Federal pipeline safety regulations establish requirements for operator procedures, emergency preparedness, incident investigation, and the safe operation of regulated natural gas infrastructure. Among potentially relevant provisions are 49 CFR §§ 192.605, 192.615, and 192.617, governing operating procedures, emergency plans, and the investigation of failures and incidents, respectively.[4]

The applicability of particular requirements depends on the infrastructure involved, the location of the regulated service-line endpoint, and the circumstances of the incident. Accordingly, please provide:

  1. PHMSA’s assessment of which portions of the natural gas infrastructure serving the affected Rainbow Terrace buildings were subject to federal pipeline safety requirements, including the applicable regulatory boundary between Enbridge-operated service lines and customer-owned piping;
  2. A description of the federal statutory and regulatory requirements applicable to Enbridge’s emergency response following the explosion, including requirements concerning prompt response, coordination with emergency personnel, identification and isolation of gas infrastructure, and mitigation of continuing hazards;
  3. Whether PHMSA has evaluated, or requested that PUCO evaluate, Enbridge’s actions following the explosion against the applicable requirements of 49 CFR Part 192, including §§ 192.605, 192.615, and 192.617;
  4. Whether the inaccurate GIS mapping, failure to identify an active service line, difficulties isolating the appropriate gas infrastructure, and post-incident leak-detection deficiencies identified by PUCO implicate any federal pipeline safety requirements and, if so, which specific provisions;
  5. Whether PHMSA or PUCO identified any violations of applicable federal pipeline safety requirements in connection with Enbridge’s response, investigation, or subsequent corrective actions. For each identified violation, please describe the applicable requirement, finding, enforcement or corrective action, and current status;
  6. Whether PHMSA has reviewed the adequacy of Enbridge’s written emergency-response and incident-investigation procedures, including whether those procedures were followed during the incident and subsequent response;
  7. Whether Enbridge has undertaken any corrective actions, modifications to operating procedures, mapping updates, employee training, additional inspections, or other safety improvements as a result of the incident, and whether PHMSA or PUCO has assessed their adequacy; and
  8. Whether PHMSA has identified any gaps between minimum federal pipeline safety requirements and recommended industry practices that may be relevant to the circumstances documented at Rainbow Terrace.

III. Incident Investigation, Documentation, and Safety Accountability

The investigation of serious pipeline incidents is essential not only to determining their causes, where possible, but also to identifying deficiencies in operator practices and preventing similar events.

Under 49 CFR § 192.617, pipeline operators must establish and follow applicable procedures for investigating and analyzing failures and incidents, including appropriate examination of failed components and incorporation of lessons learned.[5]

To better understand the applicable federal requirements and their implementation, please provide:

  1. Whether the Rainbow Terrace explosion met the federal incident-reporting criteria under 49 CFR Part 191 and, if so, whether Enbridge submitted the required notifications and reports, including any supplemental or amended submissions;
  2. Whether PHMSA has reviewed the completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of any incident reports or investigative materials submitted by Enbridge;
  3. The federal requirements applicable to Enbridge’s investigation of the incident, including the examination, documentation, testing, retention, or preservation of relevant pipeline components and other physical evidence, where required;
  4. Whether PHMSA or PUCO assessed Enbridge’s handling of physical evidence and investigative documentation for compliance with applicable regulatory requirements and, if so, the findings of that assessment;
  5. Whether PHMSA identified any limitations in the available investigative record that prevented a more complete assessment of the incident or Enbridge’s compliance with federal safety requirements;
  6. Whether PHMSA considered an independent technical review, additional testing, or coordination with the National Transportation Safety Board or other appropriate investigative entities, and whether such involvement was warranted under applicable authorities; and
  7. Whether PHMSA has identified any administrative, regulatory, or investigative practices that should be strengthened to ensure that serious natural gas incidents receive thorough, independent, and technically sound review.

IV. Coordination, Emergency Preparedness, and Lessons Learned

The Rainbow Terrace explosion underscores the importance of reliable infrastructure information, effective emergency response, and coordination among pipeline operators, first responders, and state and federal regulators.

Even where the cause of an explosion cannot be conclusively determined, documented deficiencies in the subsequent response may offer important opportunities to strengthen pipeline safety and prevent additional harm.

Accordingly, please provide:

  1. A description of PHMSA’s coordination with PUCO, Enbridge, the City of Cleveland, local emergency responders, and other relevant entities regarding the incident and its aftermath;
  2. Whether PHMSA has assessed the adequacy of federal requirements and operator practices concerning the accuracy, maintenance, and accessibility of natural gas distribution-system maps, particularly during emergencies;
  3. Whether the circumstances at Rainbow Terrace have prompted PHMSA to examine the adequacy of emergency isolation procedures, leak-detection practices, coordination with first responders, or response protocols at multifamily residential properties;
  4. Whether PHMSA has identified broader safety concerns involving older natural gas distribution infrastructure, inactive or poorly documented service lines, or the regulatory boundary between utility-operated infrastructure and customer-owned piping;
  5. Whether PHMSA has issued, or is considering, any safety advisories, technical guidance, recommended practices, training improvements, or other measures informed by the Rainbow Terrace incident or comparable events;
  6. Whether PHMSA has identified opportunities to strengthen the coordination of federal and state regulators, pipeline operators, local emergency responders, and property owners when serious natural gas incidents occur; and
  7. Any additional actions DOT or PHMSA expects to undertake to strengthen operator accountability, emergency preparedness, and the investigation of serious natural gas incidents.

The families affected by the Rainbow Terrace explosion deserve answers, continued support, and confidence that the public safety systems serving their community are functioning as intended. Although the precise cause of the explosion remains undetermined, that uncertainty should not prevent a careful assessment of the documented response deficiencies or the effectiveness of applicable safety requirements.

Congress has an important responsibility to understand how federal pipeline safety standards are implemented and enforced, whether regulatory oversight is effective, and whether serious incidents reveal opportunities to strengthen public safety.

I appreciate DOT’s and PHMSA’s attention to these matters. I respectfully request a written response within 30 days of receipt of this letter and welcome a briefing from appropriate Department and/or PHMSA staff concerning the federal regulatory responsibilities and findings discussed above.

[Signature]

cc:

The Honorable Sam Graves, Chairman, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
The Honorable Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
The Honorable Daniel Webster, Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
The Honorable Dina Titus, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
Robert Burrough, Director, Eastern Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

 

 

 

 

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[1]City of Cleveland, Department of Public Safety, Executive Summary of Rainbow Terrace Investigative Efforts (Sept. 28, 2026). Available via https://drive.google.com/file/d/10OyMMwAxgH1cFfQjkegTvqRI32rjXGTd/view. 

[2] Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Natural Gas Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (2026), included in the City of Cleveland’s investigative release, supra note 1.

[3] 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101–60106; 49 CFR Part 192.

[4] 49 CFR §§ 192.605, 192.615, 192.617.

[5] 49 CFR § 192.617.

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